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1. THE DUTY TO MARSHAL EVIDENCE IS PREMISED ON A DISPUTE 
WITH THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS OF FACT 
As discussed in some detail in the Brief of Appellee (hereafter, "Rodgers' 
Brief), in an appeal in which the appellant challenges the trial court's findings 
of fact, there is a duty on the appellant to marshal all evidence arguably 
supportive of the trial court's disputed findings, and then to point out the legal 
flaw in the reasoning or logic connecting those facts to the trial court's Order. 
(See, e.g., Scharfv. BMG Corp. 700 P.2d 1068, 1070 (Utah 1985)). This usual 
duty to marshal evidence is premised, of course, on an appellant's dispute with 
the trial court's findings of fact. 
A. Appellant Has Little, If Any Disputes With Minute Entry Order Facts 
In the case now before this Court, the trial court issued a Minute Entry Order 
dated April 15, 2008 ("trial court's Order" or "disputed Order") consisting of 
19 sentences (R. 454-57). The trial court states that the Minute Entry decision 
"will stand as the Order of the Court, granting Mr. Rodger's [sic] Motion for 
Sanctions." Id. 
Of those sentences, ten are introductory or concluding legal notes, or 
essentially undisputed statements of fact (see disputed Order, including the 
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first four sentences, the last five sentences, and sentence number eight: "As 
indicated above [sic], Mr. Rodgers was not a party to the contract at issue in 
this case"). (R. 455). 
Six of the remaining sentences are simply statements of the absence of fact (7. 
"there is absolutely no evidentiary support... "; and, 2. "In addition...the Court 
can find no evidence... "; and, 3. "In addition, the Plaintiff has never 
alleged... "; and, 4. "Simply put, the Plaintiff has never demonstrated... "; and, 
5. "the Plaintiff clearly had no factual support... "; and, 6. "the Plaintiff had 
absolutely no legal or factual basis..."). (Id.) It is axiomatic that Fay cannot 
marshal evidence in support of the trial court's findings of the absence of facts. 
One cannot prove the non-existence of a negated point. 
The remaining three sentences are disputed, to various degrees, but are 
primarily statements of the trial court's largely unsupported legal conclusions. 
As Fay argued in his Opening Brief, it is a practical impossibility to marshal 
evidence that would arguably support otherwise unsupported conclusions. 
Sentence six says: "Indeed, it is clear from the Plaintiff's opposition and his 
Affidavit that he understood throughout these proceedings that Mr. Rodgers 
was merely representing Global Travel Network" (R. 455). On its face, 
dispute of this legal conclusion would call for a complete restating of Fay's 
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Opposition and Affidavit to ferret out precisely what it is that the trial court 
found Fay to have allegedly "understood throughout these proceedings". Yet, 
by the trial court's conclusion, in sentence six, the supposedly damning 
evidence that establishes (in the trial court's view), the alleged fact at issue, is 
contained somewhere in the entirety of Fay's Memorandum in Opposition and 
Affidavit in Support. The trial court does not specify exactly what in the 
Plaintiffs opposition and in his affidavit contributes to that conclusion. Fay is 
left to either restate the entire documents, or simply refer to the documents, as 
did the trial court. 
Similarly difficult to marshal is the factual support for the trial court's 
conclusion in sentence number twelve: "Overall, it is important to point out 
that the Court is not dealing with a simple case of factual errors or 
misstatements, which are clarified upon reflection or through the discovery 
process." (R. 455). Fay is at a loss as to how he is to marshal facts to show 
the basis for the trial court's conclusion that this is not "a simple case of 
factual errors or misstatements...". Once again, he would be called upon to 
prove a negative proposition, a challenging burden, at best. 
Finally, Fay challenges the trial court's legal conclusion, in sentence fourteen, 
that "[u]nder these unique circumstances, the Court concludes that the 
Plaintiff directly violated Rule 11 and that sanctions are warranted" (R. 456). 
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This legal conclusion is premised upon a brief summary of almost wholly 
undisputed facts, and arrived at by leaps of logic that are not clearly supported 
by the text of the disputed Order. One cannot very well marshal facts in 
support of an unsupported legal conclusion. 
Finally, one sentence is a mix of undisputed fact and a mystifying leap of logic, 
which is without support in the record. Sentence sixteen states: "Further, 
while he subsequently engaged counsel, it appears to the Court that he 
continued to direct this action in most respects" (R. 456). The trial court fails 
to explain where, in the record, evidence "appears" that makes that conclusion 
logical. While Fay does not seek review of that conclusion, it remains that the 
trial court's apparent certainty on an issue had no evidentiary support in the 
record. Through the course of litigation in the trial court, covering more than 
two years, Fay personally appeared in court only once, at the trial. No 
defendant served any written discovery or took Fay's deposition. The trial 
court fails to explain how it reached the conclusion it states above. Such facts 
do not appear in the record. 
Rodgers, in his zeal to convince this Court to sidestep Fay's appeal without 
addressing the merits of the matter, accuses Fay of failing to construct the 
mandatory "magnificent array of supporting evidence." (See Rodgers' Brief at 
8, citing West Valley City v. Majestic Inv. Co., 818 P.2d 1311, 1313 (Utah Ct. 
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App. 1991). He neglects, however, to specifically parse the disputed Order and 
its repeated assertions of a complete lack of evidence on key issues. He also 
fails to discuss, as did the trial court, the merits of Fay's claim against Rodgers 
for his personal, individual acts in signing the settlement agreement. 
B. Absence of ANY Ruling on Fay's Claims Against Rodgers, Personally, 
Arising Out of the Signing and Dating of the Settlement Agreement 
Fay presented two issues related to Todd Rodgers, as a defendant, to the trial 
court for a ruling: the first involved Rodgers' relation to the fraud in the 
telephone call from a Global Travel representative, which issue is the subject 
of the trial court's disputed Order, as discussed, supra. The second issue is 
against Rodgers, personally, in relation to his acts in signing and dating of the 
Settlement Agreement, a personal act conducted by Rodgers individually. On 
this second issue, the trial court remained silent. 
The trial court simply ignored that issue, despite acknowledging (R. at 417) 
receipt and review of Fay's opposition memoranda which specifically raised 
the argument again, and noted the record evidence in support of the claims. (R. 
at 371-376, and see R. at 430-33, copies of trial exhibits no. 1 and 19). Here, 
even more clearly than in the unsupported conclusions of the disputed Order, 
Fay's alleged duty to marshal the absence of facts is similar to the 
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mathematical result of zero times zero; the result is zero. Where the trial court 
does not issue any ruling, and avoids an issue entirely, the result is clear error. 
Fay respectfully requests that this Court review the trial court's Order, as well 
as the lack of ruling on Fay's request to consider the personal liability of 
Rodgers in his actions in signing and dating the breached Settlement 
Agreement, and reverse and remand for reconsideration. 
2. THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS OF FACTS ARE CLEARLY 
ERRONEOUS, AS THEY ARE BASED ON SUPPOSITION AND 
THEORY 
The absence of facts, in the repeated assertions of the minute entry order that 
there are no facts, is the heart of one branch of the contested result. The 
finding of zero facts, where competent evidence was presented to the trial 
court, is clear error. Where, as here, the appellant can show facts that the trial 
court overlooked, ignored, or refused to address on entire issues in contest, and 
evidence in support, the appeal is properly framed for consideration. 
Again, there are two issues presented squarely on the question of clearly 
erroneous factual findings in the court below, on this appeal: 1. the finding of 
the absence of facts, as repeatedly asserted by the trial court on the issue of 
Fay's reasons for naming Rodgers as a defendant in his fraud cause of action 
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against Global, and 2. the absence of any ruling whatsoever, on the issue of 
Fay's naming Rodgers as a defendant related to his signature and date on the 
breached Settlement Agreement, (see, e.g., R. 371-76, and Order, R. 454-57). 
The trial court's lack of findings, ruling, or statement of any sort on an issue 
presented to it for ruling, is clear error. As the Utah Supreme Court has made 
abundantly clear: 
a trial court is required to make explicit findings of fact in support of its 
legal conclusions. Willey v. Willey, 951 P.2d 226, 230 (Utah 1977). This 
is particularly necessary in the Rule 11 area. The law requires that a 
trial court make a series of specific factual findings as a predicate for 
concluding that the rule has been violated... The trial court's findings and 
conclusions must reveal the court's reasoning clearly enough that an 
appellate court can apply the appropriate standard of review to each part of 
the trial court's ruling." Griffith v. Griffith, 985 P.2d 255 (Utah 1995). 
[Emphasis added]. 
Fay has shown facts, evidence, and logical connections that the trial court 
failed to discuss or address, on the first issue, related to the trial court's 
findings of "no evidence" in support of his claims. Further, the trial court 
utterly failed to discuss, address, or affirmatively confront, in any ruling, the 
issue of Rodgers' personal liability for his acts in signing and dating the 
breached settlement agreement. Both such failures in the trial court's ruling 
are fatal flaws in the trial court's duty to find facts and state them clearly, 
particularly in the context of Rule 11 sanctions, and both are clear error, which 
Fay requests this Court review and reverse. 
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3. CORRESPONDENCE FROM RODGERS AND MADDOX 
CONTRIBUTED TO THE CONFUSED UNDERSTANDING THAT FAY 
HAD OF RODGERS9 STATUS IN RELATION TO GLOBAL TRAVEL 
Rodgers argues the interpretation of evidence in his brief on this appeal, 
rehashing issues that were presented to the trial court. The flaw in using this 
forum to reargue the evidence, though, is that the trial court did not rule on that 
evidence. The trial court negated the evidence, stating at least six times that no 
such evidence is to be found in the record. 
Rodgers, however, focuses on certain details of the letters at issue (Maddox to 
Fay of February 22, 2005 (R. 509-510), and Rodgers to Fay of February 24, 
2005 (R. 511)). These details that Rodgers discusses, however, are facts that 
the trial court could have, but did not, address in its conclusions and rulings in 
this matter. Rodgers seems to want to fill the alleged "void" in evidence that 
the trial court repeatedly notes in the disputed Order. 
Phrases in the body of both letters, however, could reasonably be taken to 
establish the conclusions Fay reached in drafting his complaint, to the effect 
that Rodgers had some substantial degree of control and responsibility for the 
fraudulent activities of the telemarketers who called Fay's home, representing 
Global Travel Network (see, e.g. Rodgers' statement to the effect that he may 
seek Fay's assistance in a potential lawsuit he may file against third parties -
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which clearly implies that he has standing to sue on behalf of "his company", 
Global Travel Network. R. 511). 
Rodgers' insistence, in his Brief, on attempting to assemble what he sees as a 
"magnificent array" of evidence supporting the trial court's findings, in truth, 
simply belies the trial court's repeated statements to the effect that there is no 
evidence supporting Fay's claims. In tfris appeal, Fay respectfully requests that 
this Court review the clear error in the trial court's Order and reverse. 
4. THE AWARD OF ATTORNEY FEES UNDER RULE 11 IS 
SUBJECT TO LIMITATIONS OF REASONABLENESS AND DIRECT 
RELATION TO THE ACT IN QUESTION 
Rodgers quotes Rule 11 correctly in his Brief, but then fails to discuss the most 
relevant part of the quoted rule. He argues the merits of the inapplicable 
portions of Rule 11, relating to directives of a non-monetary nature and orders 
to pay a penalty into court. Neither portion of the rule is applicable here, as the 
trial court did not to use either of those two options. 
Rodgers pointedly avoids discussion of the two key phrases in the critical last 
sentence of Rule 11(c)(2), a subsection specifically titled "Nature of sanctions; 
limitations" [emphasis added]. It is the limitations that are relevant here, 
including a restriction that an order of attorney fees or expenses be limited to 
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"some or all of the reasonable attorney fees" [emphasis added], and that the 
fees awarded must be incurred "as a direct result" of the alleged violation. 
The controlling final portion of the relevant language is what allows imposition 
of an order of attorney fees in favor of the allegedly aggrieved party. The rule 
allows that a trial court may issue: "an order directing payment to the movant 
of some or all of the reasonable attorney fees and other expenses incurred as a 
direct result of the violation." The text of Rule 11(c)(2), and the heading 
describing it as a "limitation" on the court's sanction power, indicate that the 
trial court has a duty to assess the amount of "reasonable" fees incurred, and 
only grant recovery of some or part of such fees as were caused as a "direct 
result" of the act. 
These two limitations in the rule fit harmoniously with Fay's argument, by 
analogy, in his opening Brief, to cases considering the measure of damages 
under a breached contract. In both circumstances, the allegedly aggrieved 
party has an affirmative duty to take reasonable measures to limit the attorney 
fees and expenses incurred. 
Further, the black-letter tort principles of proximate and legal cause fit into the 
equation, as well, in the use of the phrase "as a direct result" of the act to be 
sanctioned. If the expense allegedly caused may have been cut off, by the 
10 
simple act of a defendant bringing an early, dispositive motion, for example, 
under Rule 12, then it is his duty to thereby limit such expense. If he does not, 
then it is the trial court's duty to limit the attorney fee recovery to such 
"reasonable" amount which flowed "as a direct result" from the act that 
offended the rule. 
Fay respectfully requests that this Court review the award of attorney fees, if it 
finds such an award appropriate, and remand with instructions to the trial court 
to follow the clear directions of Rule 11(c)(2). In doing so, the amount of 
attorney fees and expenses allowed to Rodgers, if any, should be limited to that 
which flowed reasonably and directly from the act of naming Rodgers as a 
defendant in the initial Complaint, and not include any amount that Rodgers 
himself, and his counsel, could reasonably have avoided. 
CONCLUSION 
Appellant Fay respectfully submits his arguments, as stated above and in his 
initial Brief, as well as any subsequent oral argument, in support of his request 
that this Court review the Minute Entry Order of the Third District Court, the 
Honorable Robert Faust, dated April 15, 2008. Plaintiff submits that this Order 
fails to follow the direction of Rule 11, U.R.CivJP., and controlling cases 
interpreting that rule, in that the Order fails to set forth, specifically and with 
adequate detail, the ways in which the trial court found that Fay violated the 
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proscriptions of Rule 11. Further, the trial court neglected to take into account, 
nor explain the absence of ruling, on Fay's arguments and evidence related to 
Defendant Rodgers' personal actions in signing and dating the Settlement 
Agreement at issue. Additionally, the trial court neglected to explain the 
reasons for failing to address Fay's argument as to the lack of reasonableness 
of Rodgers' claimed attorney fees and expenses, and the direct connection of 
those amounts to the alleged violation of the rule. 
Fay respectfully requests that this Court reverse the Order of the trial court, and, 
in the alternative, remand to the trial court for further findings and conclusions 
in keeping with the requirements of Rule 11. Finally, Fay requests an Order, 
awarding his reasonable attorney fees and expenses incurred in prosecuting this 
appeal, and in defending the Motion for Sanctions in the trial court. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this \U day of September 2009. 15 
!L. Mouritsen 
/ey for Appellant John Fay 
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